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In making corporate governance (CG) related disclosure, firms may solely focus on 
shareholders or may broaden their scope of disclosure to serve other stakeholders as well. This 
study examines whether there are differences in the disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder 
corporate governance (CG) practices. Based on a hand-collected dataset of 1110 firm-years in 
South Africa (SA), and a disclosure index using 72 CG provisions from the King III report of 
CG, we find that the disclosure of stakeholder CG practices is relatively higher than that of 
shareholder CG practices. Our evidence suggests that foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, racial diversity, and gender diversity increase total voluntary disclosure. In contrast, 
CEO age decreases total voluntary disclosure. Also, whilst foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, gender diversity and racial diversity increase both shareholder and stakeholder CG 
disclosures, CEO age has a negative relationship with both shareholder and stakeholder CG 
disclosures. Further, board size reduces shareholder disclosure but not stakeholder disclosure. 
Our results further indicate that, ceteris paribus, the extent of shareholder CG disclosure 
relative to stakeholder CG disclosure is (1) lower with board size, gender diversity and racial 
diversity and (2) higher with the level of institutional ownership. Our findings are robust across 


















In making corporate governance (CG) related disclosure, firms may solely focus on 
shareholders or may broaden their scope of disclosure to serve other stakeholders as well. 
Previous studies suggest that voluntary CG disclosure decisions are influenced by several 
factors, including ownership characteristics (Peasnell et al., 2000; Cox et al., 2004; Lim et al. 
2007; Harjoto and Jo. 2011; Dam and Scholtens, 2012), and  board characteristics (Barako et 
al., 2006; Post et al., 2011; Latridis, 2013;Lewis et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these studies 
mainly focus on total voluntary CG disclosure. In this paper, we investigate the simultaneous 
disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder CG provisions as well as the antecedents of the 
variations in these disclosures. To address these issues, we exploit the unique institutional 
setting in South Africa (SA) where a history of apartheid has impacted CG practices. Apartheid 
resulted in corporate resources being held in the hands of the minority white population in SA. 
Therefore, in the post-apartheid period, the SA government instituted several affirmative action 
rules which has become part of CG. Consequently, CG codes in SA require firms to voluntarily 
disclose CG information relating to shareholders as well as other non-shareholding 
stakeholders. 
We focus on shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures in SA for the following 
reasons. First, CEO, ownership, and board characteristics may influence firms to be 
shareholder focused or consider other non-shareholding stakeholders when making CG 
disclosure decisions. For example, foreign investors who are far from firms may demand higher 
levels of CG disclosures that protect shareholder interests (Singhvi, 1968; Hanniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008; Bokpin and Isshak, 2009). On the other hand, 
shareholder classes who invest for various strategic reasons associated with the different roles 
and positions they have in society may require firms to have a stakeholder focus in terms of 
CG disclosure (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Further, to facilitate a rent extraction objective and 
to prevent board monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 2012), long-tenured CEOs may use their 
familiarity with board members (Allgood and Ferrel, 2000), to inhibit the disclosure of 
monitoring-intensive CG provisions that protect shareholder interests. By studying the 
determinants of shareholder versus stakeholder CG disclosure practices, we can determine the 
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likelihood that a firm may solely focus on shareholder CG disclosures or broaden their scope 
to serve other stakeholders as well. Moreover, because the cost of disclosing CG information 
can be significantly high (Friedman, 1970; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012), an understanding 
of the drivers of shareholder versus stakeholder CG disclosures will be important for firms as 
they make the crucial decision of whether to focus on shareholder value creation or to create 
social value in addition.  
Second, a firm’s decision to focus solely on shareholders or broaden their scope of 
disclosure to include other stakeholders may have differential consequences. For example, a 
focus on shareholder-related CG practices may help investors identify profitable investment 
opportunities and avoid adverse selection decisions (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Ntim et al., 
2012a), minimize information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Sheu et al., 2010) and reduce bonding and monitoring costs leading to a 
reduction in the costs of capital (Beiner et al., 2006). On the contrary, the consequences of 
disclosing CG provisions that protect the interest of other non-shareholding stakeholders may 
be explained by two competing views - the conflict resolution hypothesis (Cai et al., 2011) and 
the managerial opportunism hypothesis (Choi et al., 2013). Under the conflict resolution 
hypothesis, the disclosure of stakeholder CG practices may help firms establish a reputation as 
good corporate citizens (Barnea and Rubin, 2010), reduce conflicts by bonding with powerful 
non-shareholding stakeholders (Jensen, 2001; Calton, and Payne, 2003), and legitimize 
operations to reduce political costs (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Cheung, et al. 2010). Under the 
managerial opportunism hypothesis, managers (including the CEO) promote the disclosure of 
CG practices that protect non-shareholding stakeholders for private benefits (Barnea and 
Rubin, 2010). These private benefits may include improving insider’  r putation as good social 
citizens (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) and bonding with powerful stakeholders to facilitate 
entrenchment, prevent monitoring (Prior et al., 2008) and demand higher pay (Milbourn, 2003). 
An understanding of the determinants of these disclosure practices may be necessary in dealing 
with their adverse consequences if any. Although previous studies have examined how various 
board and ownership characteristics impact voluntary CG disclosures, the SA setting with its 
hybrid CG disclosure regime allows us to observe how various CEO, board, and ownerhsip 
attributes simultaneously impact both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures. 
Utilising a unique hand-collected dataset of 185 listed SA firms and 72 CG provisions 
from 2008 to 2013, we investigate the simultaneous disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder 
CG disclosures and their antecedents. We find that although the overall level of disclosure is 
high, firms disclose more of the CG practices that relate to stakeholders relative to those that 
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relate to shareholders. The results suggest that both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures 
increase with institutional ownership, foreign ownership, gender diversity and racial diversity 
but decrease with CEO age. In contrast, board size decreases the level of shareholder CG 
disclosures but not that of stakeholder CG disclosures. Our analysis further suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, firms with at least one female director, bigger boards and at least one “non-
white” director disclose less shareholder-related CG information relative to stakeholder-related 
CG information. Conversely, firms with higher levels of institutional ownership disclose more 
shareholder-related CG information relative to stakeholder-related CG information. Our 
evidence suggests that there are both differences and similarities between the shareholder-
related and stakeholder-related CG disclosures in terms of their determinants. 
The paper contributes to the CG literature in several ways. First, the study contributes 
to the CG disclosure literature in emerging markets. Most studies on CG focus on developed 
countries because developing countries mostly adopt and replicate CG principles in developed 
countries (Lim et al., 2007; Hegazy and Hegazy, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012).  However, 
attributes such as concentrated ownership (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) and dominance of family 
ownership (Mensah, 2002) in emerging markets can weaken the market for corporate control 
and affect firms’ willingness to comply with voluntary CG principles. More so, even between 
emerging markets, differences in the levels of corporate regulations enforcements may lead to 
major deviations in disclosure practices (Bhuiyan and Biswas, 2007). We extend this strand of 
literature by explicitly considering gender and racial diversity, which have not been tested in 
prior studies.  
Second, the paper contributes to the extant literature by responding to recent calls from 
researchers to examine both shareholder-related and stakeholder-related disclosure practices 
(e.g., Filatochev and Boyd, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). Most studies have focused primarily 
on total voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Dam and scholtens, 
2012; Ntim et al. 2012b). A few studied other aggregates of voluntary disclosure. For example, 
Lim et al. (2007) examined forward looking, strategic, historical financial and non-financial 
disclosures. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) examined several other categories of voluntary 
disclosures. However, no study so far has examined the focus of disclosure in a hybrid 
disclosure regime. Our study will be useful for regulators in emerging markets considering the 
adoption of a CG structure similar to that in SA as well as developed nations seeking to 
strengthen CSR disclosure in addition to CG disclosures.  
Lastly, we provide evidence on the determinants of variation in shareholder versus 
stakeholder CG disclosures. Previous studies examined the effect of various board and 
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ownership attributes on aspects of voluntary disclosure. We investigate how these attributes 
influence one of shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures relative to the other. This is 
necessary for a deeper understanding of the drivers of firms’ disclosure choices. To our 
knowledge, this has not been examined in the literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional framework and 
CG in SA. Section 3 discusses theoretical literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 
presents the research design and the results are analysed in section 5. Section 6 presents results 
of robustness tests and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Corporate Governance in South Africa 
That good CG practices may lead to a reduction in the cost of capital, improve top-level 
decision-making, and better corporate environment is globally recognized (International 
Finance Corporation, 2009). In developing countries it attracts foreign investments, provides 
support for private sector growth, and boost employment opportunities (Dahawy, 2008). 
Therefore after the collapse of apartheid - a system of legal racial segregation that brought in 
its trail mass unemployment and racial inequality, CG reforms became a necessity for SA. 
  The first CG code (King I) was produced in 1994. However, similar to most emerging 
countries and as posited by Samaha et al. (2012), CG practices in emerging countries mostly 
tend to follow the practices in developed countries. Subsequently, King I adopted most of the 
CG disclosure reforms in the 1992 UK Cadbury report (King Committee, 1994). More so, 
unlike most emerging countries, King I also demonstrated an appreciation of the presence of 
differences that rise to the need for CG between developed and emerging nations (Rabelo and 
Vasconcelos, 2002; Ntim et al. 2012a). Therefore, in addition to asking firms to report to 
shareholders, King I also required firms to separately report to other stakeholders. This implied 
that unlike the UK 1992 Cadbury report, King I adopted an integrated approach to CG (West, 
2006). 
SA produced the second CG report (King II) in 2002. King II made some far-reaching 
recommendations by explicitly promoting the “inclusive” CG approach.  This approach sought 
to strengthen the various shareholder-related disclosures and in addition explicitly required 
firms to disclose some specific SA affirmative action rules such as Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) and HIV AIDS, among others (Ntim et al. 2012a). These clarifications 
strengthened CG in SA and made the requirements clearer to SA firms. 
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In 2009, the third CG code (King III) was released. In line with its predecessors, King 
III also sought to strengthen CG provisions that promote the interest of both shareholders and 
stakeholders. King III attemptsed to create a balance between international CG practices and 
African peculiarities (Gstraunthaler, 2010). It strengthened the shareholder CG provisions in 
King II. It prescribed a unitary board structure with a majority non-executive directors. More 
so, similar to King II, it frowned on CEO duality and recommended a minimum of two 
executive directors on SA corporate boards. King III also catered for the interest of 
shareholders by recommending shareholder vote on pay at the AGM.  
Further, King III catered for stakeholder interests by attempting to increase the level of 
importance attached to sustainability issues by asking firms to make it an integral part of the 
financial reporting process (Gstraunthaler, 2010).  King III demanded that firms become 
proactive instead of reactive in dealing with issues relating to stakeholders. Specifically, King 
III required boards to identify the interests of legitimate stakeholders and aske  management 
to deal with them appropriately.  However, unlike King II which explicitly asked firms to 
disclose their compliance with specific affirmative action rules as BEE, employment equity, 
HIV Aids among others, King III stateD that firms should comply and disclose their 
compliance with both binding and non-binding rules in SA. This is because at the time King 
III was being prepared, most of these affirmative action rules had been properly enacted in SA.  
Moreover, to ensure the credibility of the stakeholder-related CG disclosures, King III required 
audit committees to provide assurance on the sustainability issues in the integrated report and 
also to consider appointing an independent assurance provider to do the same. A summary of 





3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
This section discusses relevant theoretical literature on the determinants of voluntary CG 
disclosure and also sets hypotheses. The determinants consist of characteristics pertaining to 
the CEO, the board, and shareholders. 
 
Theoretical framework  
Agency theory suggests a hypothetical relationship between the principal 
(shareholders) and an agent ((Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
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Jensen, 1984; Jensen and Roebach, 1983). Within this view shareholders who are owners of 
the business engage the services of managers to run the business on their behalf (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).As a result, the principal becomes an outsider whiles the agent becomes an 
insider and has more information about the company relative to the principal. This separation 
of ownership from control also results in the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1979). This 
agency problem is particularly grave when self-interested managers have different goals from 
their self-interested principals (Eisenhadt, 1989). Thus, from an agency theory perspective, the 
main objective of corporate governance is to solve the agency problem (Fama and Jensen 
1983). This may be achieved through increased information disclosure aimed at reducing the 
existing information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. Accordingly, several 
studies have highlighted the ability of several corporate governance mechanisms including 
audit quality (Francis, Maydew, and Spark, 1999), Board independence (Siregar and Utama, 
2008), and the audit committee (Klein, 2002) to mitigate agency problems by increasing 
information disclosure. However, a major caveat of this agency theory perspective is that 
information disclosure is only targeted at shareholders and it does not consider the interests of 
other non-shareholding stakeholders. 
The stakeholder theory on the hand adopts a broader approach to corporate governance 
that takes into consideration the interests of other stakeholders in addition to shareholders 
(Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders may include suppliers, employees, government customers, 
investors etc. whose activities may affect or is affected by the organisation (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Freeman (1994) in particular argued that firms have a moral obligation to 
consider the interests of other non-shareholding stakeholders because even though corporate 
law requires managers to manage firms in the interest of shareholders, corporate law may not 
be the only that governs organisations. This is intuitive because in the SA specific case firms 
are governed by other legislations such as the broad-based black economic empowerment Act, 
the employment equity Act among others. Thus, firms may have to structure information 
disclosure in a way that does not only reduce asymmetric information between managers and 
shareholders but also between managers and other non-shareholding stakeholders. 
However, the multiplicity of stakeholders vis-à-vis the potential for the interests of 
these stakeholders to conflict means that firms may have to prioritise the interests of one 
stakeholder over the other (Pichet, 2011). Jensen and Meckling(1979) in particular suggested 
that firms may mainly focus on “relevant stakeholders”. Nevertheless, a major source of 
ambiguity within the stakeholder concept is the issue of who a relevant stakeholder is. For 
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example in continental Europe where countries have a two-tier board structure, a stakeholder 
may be relevant to the extent that they are represented on the supervisory board. However, in 
Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK, USA and South Africa, even though firms are required to 
identify and meet the interests of relevant stakeholders, no mention is made of who these 
relevant stakeholders. Arguably, to the extent that various firm-level decisions are greatly 
influenced by the characteristics of the CEO (Strerling 2014; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), 
shareholders (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), and the board 
(Forker, 1992; Tricker 1984), these will influence the choice of relevant stakeholders when 
firms are making disclosure-related decisions. 
CEO Characteristic 
CEO Age 
Older CEOs are more experienced and may better appreciate the consequences of 
voluntary disclosure than younger CEOs. Sterling (2014) argues that older CEOs are risk 
averse compared to younger CEOs. He contends that older CEOs are more conservative and 
make investments that reduce firm risks. Older CEOs may thus disclose more shareholder 
specific information to avert risks associated with shareholder activism. This view is shared by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) who note that older CEOs are more concerned with future 
financial security and as such less likely to pursue risky strategies. Non-disclosure of voluntary 
CG information is indeed a risky strategy given the recent emphasis on information disclosure. 
Huang et al. (2012) document that older CEOs are associated with higher earnings quality, 
suggesting that older CEOs lead to higher disclosure quality.  
The accounting psychology literature also suggests linkages between age and 
ethical/moral behaviour. Chiu (2003) and Dawson (1997) argue that people display more 
ethical behaviour with age. Barnet and Carson (1989) investigate the importance of ethics in 
managerial decision making. They report that, compared to older respondents, younger 
respondents acted less ethically in various ethical scenarios. Chan et al. (2002) indicate that 
younger managers are more apt to resort to unethical activities to boost firm profitability than 
their older counterparts. Ostensibly, younger managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management and hinder disclosure to circumvent the possible consequences. However, “Th  
stakeholder idea, remember, is typically offered as a way of integrating ethical values into 
management decision making” (Goodpaster 1991, p. 5). Therefore, if older CEOs are more 




H1: CEO age increases stakeholder-related information disclosure more relative to 




Foreign owners are far from corporations, and may be disadvantaged in their quest for 
information regarding the firm, making board monitoring generally problematic for them. 
However, Mangena and Tauringa (2008) maintain that Zimbabwean firms with higher 
disclosure levels have lower information asymmetry between domestic and foreign owners. 
This means that higher-quality disclosure may address the information asymmetry between 
domestic and foreign investors.  Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) note that foreigners positively 
influence good CG and high disclosure levels. Others, including Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and 
Singhvi (1968), have also reported a positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
disclosure levels.  
Further, even though the literature generally shows a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and disclosure levels, the disclosure - whether of a shareholder- or 
stakeholder-orientation may depend on the origin of these foreign owners. Moreover, SA has 
a close affinity with the Anglo-Saxon countries of the UK, the USA and Australia. This is 
because, as the third largest gold producer in the world (only behind China and Australia), most 
mining firms in SA are subsidiaries of Australian mining firms. Also, as a former British 
colony, SA has strong trade relations with the UK. For example, as at October 2012, over half 
of foreign direct investments in SA were from the UK (www.southafrica.info). Barako (2004) 
argued that in the case of multinationals where foreign ownership exists in a parent-subsidiary 
relationship, there is likely to be foreigners on the boards of these companies who may 
influence financial reporting and disclosure towards that of the parent company. Therefore, 
similar to their parent companies, they are likely to lean more towards shareholder-related 
information disclosure at the expense of stakeholder-related information disclosure. 
 More so, given the uniqueness of the stakeholder provisions in SA, they are likely to 
be alien to even foreign investors in traditional stakeholder-oriented countries such as Germany 
and France.  Therefore, although foreign owners may increase pressure for higher disclosure 
levels as posited by previous studies, this pressure may mainly be in favour of shareholder-





H2: The level of foreign ownership increases shareholder-related information disclosure 
relative to stakeholder-related information disclosure.   
 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors have strong fiduciary relationships which may propel their 
inclination towards voluntary CG disclosure (Hawley and Williams, 2000). Compared to 
individuals, institutional investors mostly have larger stakes in firms, and instances when exit 
is costly, they are motivated to choose monitoring ahead of free riding (Chung and Zhang, 
2011). Institutional investors may thus require higher level of voluntary disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry and monitoring costs. This is because good voluntary CG disclosure 
improves transparency and reduces information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders 
(Chung et al., 2004). This view is also shared by Diamond and Verrechia (1991) who note that 
institutional investors encourage higher level of voluntary disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry. They invest mainly for financial returns and are expected to manage risk 
effectively in the best interest of their ultimate investors (OECD, 2011). This means that they 
may be more interested in the disclosure of CG practices that protects the interests of 
shareholders. Notwithstanding this, Ntim et al. (2012a) report a positive relationship between 
stakeholder-oriented CG disclosure and firm financial performance in SA. Cox et al. (2004) 
also find a positive relationship between institutional investment and CSR disclosure in the 
UK. Harjoto and Jo (2011) note that CSR information disclosure can be effective in managing 
the risk of stakeholder activism. Therefore, as competent risk managers, institutional investors 
may not hinder this disclosure but have natural inclination towards shareholder-oriented CG 
disclosures. We therefore hypothesise that: 
H3: Institutional ownership increases shareholder-related information disclosure relative to 
stakeholder-related information disclosure.   
 
Non-executive Directors (Board Independence) 
Shareholders and managers only sign an incomplete contract (Hart, 1989). These parties 
may have diverging interests; so a board is put in place to renegotiate any event that may arise 
but was unforeseeable at the time the contract was signed (Williamson, 1985). Whether boards 
can better renegotiate these unforeseen circumstances to the benefit of shareholders may 
depend on its composition.  
Agency theory postulates that executive directors are self-interested and are likely to 
pursue their self-interests to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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However, non-executive directors are outsiders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), independent of 
management (Lim et al., 2007) and better representatives of shareholders’ interests (Pincus et 
al., 1989). Based on this view, outside directors may increase corporate disclosure directly and 
indirectly. Firstly, they may increase disclosure directly by strenuously monitoring 
management to ensure compliance with voluntary disclosure codes of CG. In this instance, they 
may positively affect both shareholder- and stakeholder-related information disclosures. 
Secondly, outside directors may indirectly increase corporate disclosure by reducing the 
benefits of withholding information (Forker, 1992) because they have a positive influence on 
board deliberations and decisions (Pearce and Zahra, 1992).  
Resource dependency theory posits that businesses face risks if they are unable to 
connect with the external resources which are vital for their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). On the other hand, outside directors may serve as a bridge between the firm and its 
external environment (Tricker, 1984). Firms that are well-linked with their external 
environment may benefit through advice and counsel, communication channels, and legitimacy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Liu et al., 2014). In terms of advice and counsel, non-executive 
directors bring to the board expertise (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) which could lead to higher 
quality deliberations at the board level. In terms of communication channels, because of their 
experience outside the firm, they are in a better position to link their firms with other external 
stakeholders (Liu et al., 2014). For legitimacy, various CG codes are preaching the appointment 
of outside directors as a mark of good CG. Therefore, firms gain legitimacy by accepting this 
societal norm and value.  
Ferris et al. (2003) argued that outside director reputation is a function of the past 
performance of the firms on whose boards they have served. Therefore, despite their limited 
involvement in the running of the firm, outside directors are exposed to a higher level of risk 
which can soil their reputation. Independent directors may therefore push for voluntary 
disclosure at a level that reflects their minimal involvement in the organisation in order to 
reduce their risk (Lim et al., 2007).  
Empirically, Peasnell et al. (2000) found a positive relationship between outside 
directors and earnings quality. This is because outside directors boost the monitoring of the 
quality of financial statement disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) and are associated with the 
disclosure of forward looking and strategic information (Lim et al., 2007). Others, including 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Adams and Hossain (1998), have all reported a positive 
relationship between independent directors and voluntary disclosure. Notwithstanding these, 
others have argued in favour of a negative relationship between outside directors and voluntary 
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disclosure. For example, excessive monitoring by outside directors may incentivise managers 
to starve them of the right information required for effective monitoring (Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Felaye et al., 2011). Other studies have also documented instances where outside directors lack 
requisite business knowledge (Patton and Baker, 1987) and real independence (Hwang and 
Kim, 2009) to effectively monitor. 
To our knowledge, the relationship between non-executive directors and disclosure has 
not been examined in SA. King III requires that SA boards have a majority of non-executive 
directors and we believe that this number will facilitate greater monitoring and increase 
voluntary disclosure in general. However, as representatives of shareholders, we expect them 
to favour the disclosure of shareholder-related information than stakeholder-related 
information. We thus hypothesise that:  
 
H3: The proportion of non-executive directors increases shareholder-related information 
disclosure relative to stakeholder-related information disclosure.   
 
Board Size 
Board size is defined as the total number of directors including both executive and non-
executive directors on the board (Lim et al., 2007). The effect of board size on voluntary 
disclosure may be explained by two competing theories - agency theory and resource 
dependency theory.  
From agency theory perspective, boards play a crucial role in monitoring the activities 
of management (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). Jensen (1993) notes that larger boards are 
associated with shirking and free riding, difficult to coordinate, and comparatively easier to 
control by entrenched CEOs. Larger board size negatively affects board effectiveness 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Hearn, 2013). This means that members of larger boards are less likely 
to effectively participate in strategic decision making on issues such as voluntary disclosure. 
On the contrary, smaller boards are likely to be cohesive and effective (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992), have less agency problems (Yawson, 2006) and as such may increase voluntary 
disclosure. 
According to the resource dependency theory, larger boards offer diversity in contacts, 
experience, and skills which smaller boards may lack (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Specifically, 
larger boards offer increased diversity in boards’ financial and non-financial expertise (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992). This diversity leads to higher earnings quality through quality voluntary 
disclosure (Srinidhi et al., 2011; Samaha et al., 2012).  
13 
 
Further, larger boards are more likely to be diverse in terms of board member 
heterogeneity. For example, Butler (2012) argued that larger boards are likely to consist of 
people of different races, gender and backgrounds. This may be true in the SA context where 
fi rms are increasingly under pressure to make board appointments based on a need to comply 
with affirmative action rules. Therefore, bigger boards are likely to have representatives of 
different interest groups. This may facilitate the disclosure of information to meet the specific 
needs of the groups they represent, thereby increasing voluntary disclosure of stakeholder-
related information. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
H4: Board size increases stakeholder-related information disclosure relative to shareholder-




From a signalling theory perspective, managers may disclose CG information to signal 
their compliance with relevant CG codes (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Trueman and Titman, 
1988; Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Spence, 2002; Bird and Smith, 2005; Richardson, 2000). 
However, information disclosed for signalling purposes may exclude negative information 
(Connelly et al. (2011). Gender schema theory (Bem, 1993) posits that persons with a less-
developed masculine schema (typically females) are more likely to accept and disclose 
negative and trauma-related information, as processing and disclosing such information is 
accordant with the schema. Consequently, relative to homogeneously male boards, boards with 
females may increase the general level of disclosure of both positive (consistent with signalling 
theory) and negative information (consistent with gender schema theory).  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) noted that female directors are stringent monitors and 
demand more audit efforts than male directors. They show that women on board are positively 
related to CEO turnover following poor share price performance. A diverse board increases 
independence, reduces board member connivance, and augurs well for tough questioning 
(Butler, 2012). Gender-diverse boards may mitigate the effect of entrenched managers who 
may want to inhibit disclosure for opportunistic gains (Gul et al. 2011). Women representation 
may thus improve CG in poorly-governed firms (Liu et al. 2014).  
In terms of disclosure type, women have higher standards of ethical behaviour and are 
more concerned with the wellbeing of society in general (Transparency International, 2000). 
Moreover, women participation is associated with higher levels of transparency and lower 
levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2000).  Diverse boards are more likely to 
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support and influence the community (Hillman et al., 2002). They disclose more environmental 
information (Post et al., 2011), have higher levels of charitable donations (Williams, 2003) and 
are associated with higher levels and higher quality CSR programmes (Soares et al., 2011). 
Gender diversity may thus lean more towards stakeholder CG disclosure.  We, therefore, 
hypothesise that: 
 
H5: Gender diversity increases stakeholder-related disclosure relative to shareholder-related 
disclosure.   
 
Racial Diversity 
Executive monitoring is one of the main functions of corporate boards (Felaye et al, 
2011). But entrenched CEOs may attempt to fill boards with their cronies with a view to 
avoiding monitoring (Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). This potentially leads to the creation of 
racially homogeneous boards in which the CEO recruits people of similar demographic features 
(Westpal and Milton, 2000). This may affect the board in two ways. First, racially 
homogeneous boards have smoother communication and transparency internally (Butler, 
2012). This is because racially diverse groups approach issues from different perspectives, drag 
group discussions, and may encourage the formation of subgroups within groups (Lang, 1986; 
Butler, 2012). Second, racial heterogeneity in boards may facilitate communication to 
heterogeneous stakeholders such as employees and shareholders, among others, when this 
audience is acially diverse. Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) note a negative relationship between 
social diversity (including racial and gender diversity) and corporate opacity. Consequently, 
racial diversity may improve CG disclosure. 
Boards with minorities have greater independence from management which can be a 
recipe for greater monitoring (Broome et al., 2011). Broome et al. (2011) argue that board racial 
diversity can be a powerful public relations tactic to silence diversity advocates. This may be 
particularly true when the presence of racial minorities on boards foster the disclosure of 
diversity-related information (stakeholder focus). This is because racial minorities are powerful 
in influencing the under-represented race in the organisation and may thus push for the 
disclosure of more stakeholder information to appease their group. 
In SA, although the whites are the minority in terms of the country’s population, they 
are the majority in the corporate endeavour. This is mainly because apartheid deprived the 
blacks of quality education leaving the non-white community to compete for the available blue-
colour jobs. The African National Congress (ANC) government thus enacted the BBBEE Act 
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of 2003 to, among others, encourage the appointment of “blacks” on corporate boards and other 
senior management positions. It is thus instructive to expect the presence of “blacks” on SA 
boards to push for the disclosure of information that seek to protect the interest of “blacks” in 
SA. Based on these arguments, we hypothesise that: 
 
H6: Racial diversity increases stakeholder-related information disclosure relative to 
shareholder-related information disclosure.   
 
4. Research Design 
Data and Sample Selection 
The study uses two sets of data: corporate governance data and financial data. The financial 
data are collected from DataStream. Data on all corporate governance variables are obtained 
from company annual reports. Annual reports are obtained from African Financials Database 
and company websites. Where annual reports are not available from these two sources, they 
are directly obtained from companies via email. The sample period spans from 2008 to 2013. 
This has been carefully chosen to cover the introduction of the third CG code (King III). As at 
the sample date, there were 393 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The 
sample consisted of 108 financial and 2 utility firms. We exclude these financial and utility 
firms because they are heavily regulated (Tian and Twite, 2011) and this may impact differently 
on their disclosure practices. This is also in consistent with previous studies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ntim et al. 2012). The exclusion of financial and utility firms reduced our sample 
to 283 firms. Further, Baltagi, (2012) note that an unbalanced panel may be associated with 
attrition bias, self-selection and non-response which may affect regressions estimates. 
However, although a potential weakness of a balanced panel is the introduction of survivorship 
bias, balanced panels allow observations of the firms in every time period. This reduces the 
noise associated with unit heterogeneity. Due to this, a balanced panel is preferred to 
unbalanced panel in this study. Consequently, 98 firms with missing annual reports were 
further deleted from the sample. The final sample consists of a balanced panel of 185 unique 
firms representing 1110 observations. Notwithstanding the deletions, our procedure generated 
a much larger sample size than has been used in recent South African studies (Ntim et al. 2012a; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
 
Development of the Corporate Governance Disclosure Indices 
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The study uses CG provisions in the 2009 King III report of CG in SA (see appendix 
2) as dependent variables. Following the methodology of Ntim et al. (2012a), three main CG 
indices are constructed. First, a disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions that cater for 
shareholder interests (SHARE) is constructed. The index covers six components in King III 
namely, board of directors, audit committee, the governance of risk, governance of information 
technology, internal audit, integrated report and disclosure. Second, another CG index 
consisting of 11 corporate governance provisions (STAKE) that cater for stakeholder interests 
is constructed. This index is based on the section of King III report that focuses on governing 
stakeholder relationships. Finally, a third index is built consisting of all of the 72 (GOVIN) CG 
provisions in King III.  See appendix 2 for a full list of the King III CG provisions. 
All the indices are constructed using a dichotomous variable where a firm gets a score 
of “1” if an item is disclosed, otherwise “0”. We choose an unweighted index because there is 
no a priori theory for assigning weights to CG disclosure items (Black et al., 2006). This 
approach has also been used extensively by previous studies (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). To increase reliability, we code each annual report 
twice and the scores compared (Cooke, 1992; 1996). Where discrepancies exist, the annual 
report is read a third time for reconciliation.  
A disclosure index 
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n = number of items expected for thj firm at time t, jtn = one of 61, 11, and 72 for     
SHARE, STAKE and GOVIN, respectively. 





To test the determinants of shareholder versus stakeholder disclosures, we adopt a random 
effects model1 in the form: 
                                                     
 
1 The main issues that come with panel data modelling is how to deal with problems of observed and unobserved 

























itDisc = voluntary disclosure (one of GOVIN SHARE, STAKE ,SHST  and any of the 
other sub-indices with each regressed alternatively) for firm i  at time t  
 = unobservable firm-specific heterogeneity and 
i is the parameter of time dummy 
variable. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
5. Results 
The extent of Corporate Governance Disclosure in South Africa 
Table 2 shows that, on average, firms disclose 61.44% (approximately 44 provisions) 
of the 72 provisions. Compared to other emerging markets, the mean level of CG disclosure in 
SA is quite high. For example, Chau and Gay (2002) reported means of 12.2% and 13.83% for 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, respectively. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) reported an average 
disclosure level of 16% in Egypt. In fact, the level of disclosure is higher than that of Sweden 
(36.97%) (Cooke 1989) and compares favourably with the mean disclosure of 65.2% reported 
by Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) for the European Union. This indicates that, compared to 
other emerging markets, CG in SA is relatively well-developed. Further, SHARE has a mean 
of 60.53% compared to 65.72% for STAKE. Implicitly, in relative terms firm disclose more of 
the CG provisions that protect the interests of stakeholders than that of shareholders. 
Notwithstanding this, STAKE has a higher standard deviation (28.63) than SHARE (18.83). 
                                                     
 
conducted before a panel estimation technique is adopted. We therefore conduct a raft of diagnostic tests to guide 
us in our choice of a suitable estimating technique. First, using the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
test, we examine whether any of the individual or time specific variance components are equal to zero. The test 
rejected a null hypothesis of no random effect in the data. This means a r dom effect model is better able to deal 
with this heterogeneity than pooled OLS. Second, the null hypothesis of an F-test is also rejected across all the 
models meaning that at least one dummy parameter are not equal to zero. This indicates significant fixed-effects 
and warrants the use of a fixed effect model over pooled OLS. Therefore the Hausman test is run to inform the 
choice of either fixed or random-effects. The Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis that individual 
effects are uncorrelated with other regressors leading to the adoption of a random-effects model. Nevertheless, 
the Hauaman tests also indicated that V_b-B   is not positive definite. This implies that the results of the 
Hausman tests remain inconclusive. Based on these, although the main analysis is based on the results from the 





This implies that, although the average disclosure for STAKE is higher than that of SHARE, 
disclosure seemS more polarized for STAKE where scores on STAKE deviate more from the 
mean than SHARE. This is evidenced by the minimum and maximum values which ranges 8% 
to 100% and from 12.23% to 98.59% for STAKE and SHARE, respectively. This indicates that 
although the various stakeholder provisions in KING III have been well received by SA listed 
firms, there are still compliance issues where some firms disclose less of these stakeholder CG 
provisions. 
More so, SHST has a mean of 0.29. This indicates that, in relative terms, only 29% of 
the sample firms disclose more SHARE than STAKE. However, given that the SA government 
has indicated its preparedness to consider firms’ compliance on certain aspects of the STAKE 
provisions in the award of contracts and renewal of licences, this finding is not surprising. 
Firms may thus find an increasing need to disclose their compliance on the STAKE provisions 
to increase their chances of winning a government contract. BOD has a mean of 64.99% and a 
standard deviation of 23.9. AC has the highest mean of all the sub-indices (69.83%). This is in 
contrast with Samaha et al. (2012) who report the least disclosure in the auditing category in 
Egypt. This is not surprising given the level of emphasis King III places on audit committees. 
For example, Section 94(2) of the 2008 companies Act has significantly improved the status of 
the audit committee from being just a board committee to a separate statutory committee 
appointed by shareholders with statutory responsibilities (KPMG, 2009). Further, GR and IA 
have means of 62.66 and 56.13 respectively whilest IRD- one of the major sections of King III 
that distinguishes it from its predecessors have a mean of 54.71%. This indicates that, although 
new, SA listed firms are disclosing an appreciable number (54.71%) of CG provisions 
pertaining to integrated reporting and disclosure. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
The Level of shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures across JSE Industry 
Classifications 
The level of Compliance across the JSE-Industry Classification. 
Table 3 Panel A shows that the overall level of disclosure (GOVIN) is high across industries 
(ranging from 59.02% to 69.18%). The healthcare industry has the highest level of disclosure 
(69.18%) on GOVIN followed by technology (62.99%) with basic materials (62.52%) taking 
the third place. More so, consumer goods have the lowest level of CG disclosure (59.02%). 
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With respect to SHARE, healthcare has the highest level of disclosure (68.39%) followed by 
telecommunication (62.12%) before consumer services with consumer goods having the least 
disclosure score (58.07%). In contrast, telecommunications have the highest score on STAKE 
(78%) followed by healthcare (73.95%) before basic materials (68.22%). With a population 
consisting of approximately 79% Blacks (Census 2011), it is reasonable to expect industries 
like telecommunication and healthcare  that provide direct services to the public to disclose 
more CG provisions that relate to other non-shareholding stakeholders. Satorious and Botha 
(2008) document how SA companies associate aspects of STAKE to market shares in SA. 
Moreover, industrials (mainly dominated by mining firms) may need to disclose more STAKE 
to facilitate the renewal of their licenses and other concessions by the SA government. 
However, across all the industrial classifications, disclosure is higher for STAKE than SHARE. 
More so,   with the exception of consumer services, the difference in mean is statistically 
significant across all industries.  
Table 3 Panel B shows that disclosure of SHARE relative to STAKE (SHST) is highest 
in the consumer services industry (32%). In contrast, telecommunication firms have the highest 
score on STSH (86%). This confirm the earlier assertion that disclosure of STAKE may be 
driven by the need to increase market share as contended by Sartorious and Botha (2008). Table 
3 shows that with the exception of the consumer goods industry, all other industries have 
statistically significant intra-industry variations in the disclosure of shareholder and 
stakeholder CG practices. However, across all industries, STAKE has a higher mean than 
SHARE. Again, disclosure on BOD ranges from 60.35% to 68.29% with healthcare and 
telecommunications industries having the highest and lowest levels of disclosures respectively. 
More so, technology firms disclose more CG information relating to audit committees than 
firms in other industries. The technology industry consists of high growth firms (Hahl, 
Vahamaa and Aijo, 2014; Saade, 2015) that constantly incur higher research and development 
expenditures (Saade, 2015) and thus has a lower dividend payment propensity. Therefore, 
investors may require stronger financial oversight mechanisms to ensure that retained earnings 
are not used for managerial perquisites. Therefore, the highest level of CG disclosures relating 
to audit committees in the technology industry is not surprising. Also, telecommunication 
industry has the highest level of disclosure for GRI (77.145), IA (64.81%) and IRD (63.88%). 
 [INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
The level of shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures across firm Years. 
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Table 4 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the level of compliance on the shareholder 
and stakeholder CG disclosures across years. It indicates that for the overall index (GOVIN), 
compliance has increased steadily across the sample period. The lowest level of compliance 
for GOVIN is 50.38% in 2008. This increased to 57.34% in 2009 through to 68.07% in 2013. 
Given that the King III report was released in 2008 with the requirements for listed firms to 
comply by 2009, the steady increments across the sample period is intuitive. Arguably, this is 
due to the fact that firms required time to implement the various CG provisions. Similarly, 
compliance for SHARE and STAKE have increased steadily from 2008-2013. SHARE ranges 
from 49.43% in 2008 to 67.11% in 2013 whilst STAKE ranges 54.73% in 2008 to 72.52% in 
2013. Also, across all the firm years, STAKE has higher means than SHARE and the difference 
is statistically significant.  
Further, Table 4 Panel B show that in 2008, SHST (STSH) had a mean of 34% (65%) 
indicating that in relative terms, 34% (65%) of firms disclosed more SHARE (STAKE) than 
STAKE (SHARE). However, mean of SHST fell from 34% in 2008 to 28% in 2009 with that 
of STSH increasing from 65% to 71% in 2009. The fall in SHST could be attributed to the new 
far-reaching shareholder provisions imposed on firms by King III. So that firms required time 
to put in place the necessary mechanisms for their disclosure. In contrast, SHST increased 
steadily, from 2009 through to 2010 before declining to a psaltery 7% in 2013. That is as at 
2013, approximately 92% of firms disclosed more STAKE than SHARE. It may thus be 
conjectured that King III has seen a significant improvement in the disclosure of CG 
mechanisms that protect the interests of other non-shareholding stakeholders. This may be 
because, contrary to King II, King III required firms to include both the shareholder provisions 
and the stakeholder provisions in an integrated report. Arguably, this has further reduced the 
shareholder-centric disclosure view of managers (Rambaud and Richard, 2015).  Results for 
the other sub-indices (BOD, AC, GRI, IA and IRD) general indicate that compliance levels 
have increased from 2008-2013.  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the independent variables 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the regressions. The 
results show wide-spreads.  For example, the natural logarithm of CEO AGE has a mean of 
3.91 and with 3.91 and 4.11 at the 25th and 95th percentiles. Similarly, FORO has a mean of 
2.58%. This seems small for the level of foreign ownership. Nevertheless, this may be 
attributed to the fact that most of the foreign owned firms did not have enough data across the 
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sample period and was thus excluded from the sample. Notwithstanding this, FORO has a 
standard deviation of 12.08 which is an indication of widespread. Similarly, INSO has mean 
of 21.43% and a standard deviation of 31.12. Results for BIND indicate that non-executive 
directors occupy 44.22% of total board seats and at the 95th percentile 80% of total number of 
directors are non-executive directors. Further, BSIZE and GDIV have means of 2.17 and 0.63. 
This indicates that 63% of firms have at least one woman director. More so, GDIV has a mean 
of 0.55 which implies that 55% of the sampled firms have at least one ethnic minority director.  
Moreover, results for the control variables show wide spreads with LEV having a mean of 0.49 
and a median of 0.48. Similarly, GROWTH has a mean of 17.43 which compares favourably 
with that of Ntim et al. (2012) who reported a mean of 12.27% for SA listed firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
Correlation Matrix of the Variables used in the regressions 
Table 6 presents a Pearson’s correlation matrix2 of the variables used in the regressions. 
Regarding the dependent variables, the results indicate that SHARE and STAKE exhibit 0.98 
and 0.82 correlations with GOVIN respectively. Also, SHARE has a correlation of 0.72 with 
STAKE. However, since SHARE and STAKE are sub-indices of GOVIN, the high correlations 
are not surprising. This is also consistent with Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) who report a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and CSR in South Africa. Most 
importantly, SHARE STAKE, and GOVIN3 are not included in the same regressions. More so, 
correlations between the independent variables are generally low with no single correlation 
above 0.6 which indicates less multicollinearity concerns. The results indicate that FORO, 
RDIV and GDIV have positive correlations with GOVIN and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This indicates associations between voluntary CG disclosure and the level of foreign 
ownership, gender diversity and ethnic diversity. Also BSIZE and LEV have positive and 
negative relationships with GOVIN respectively. This supports the argument that bigger boards 
are likely to have representatives of diverse groups which may lead to increased disclosure to 
satisfy the need of these diverse group. Interestingly, INSO has a positive relationship with 
                                                     
 
2 We also evaluated multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF). The mean VIF was 2.34 indicating 
that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
3 GOVIN is the main CG index whilst SHARE and STAKE are sub-indices or GOVIN. Expectedly, high 
correlations among these variables are unsurprising. These high correlations imply that including these variables 
will results in multicollinearity. As a results, these variables are regressed alternatively (in different regressions) 
to mitigate the possible multicollinearity problems. 
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SHST whilst RDIV and GDIV exhibit negative relationships with SHST. These correlations 
confirm the various predictions in the hypotheses. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Regression Results 
Table 7 presents results of the random effects regressions with cluster-robust standard 
errors4 for the aggregate CG score (GOVIN) as well as all the sub-indices. The results indicate 
that AGE has a negative relationship with GOVIN and statistically significant at the 5% level 
(AGE = -6.65, T-Statistics=-2.46). Similarly, AGE has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with STAKE (AGE = -4.86, T-Statistics = -2.03), SHARE (AGE = -9.68, T-
Statistics = 3.69), and across all the other sub-indices with the exception of IRD. More 
importantly, AGE has no statistically significant relationship with SHST (AGE = 0.06, T-
Statistics = 0.12) leading to the rejection of H1 These findings imply that CEO age does not 
explain the relative disclosure of shareholder and other non-shareholder stakeholders related 
CG information. The results also indicate that older CEOs disclose less CG information. This 
finding is surprising and inconsistent with the argument that older CEOs are risk-averse and 
would disclose more CG information to avoid the risk of shareholder activism (Sterling, 2014). 
The finding is also in contrast with Chan et al. (2002) who argued that younger managers are 
more likely to resort to unethical activities such as non-disclosure than their older counterparts. 
Notwithstanding these, Hallock (1997) notes that CEO compensation increases with the CEOs 
age and seniority albeit at a declining rate. This implies that older CEOs may not necessarily 
behave ethically. In the SA case, this result may be attributed to the high levels of block holder 
ownerships in SA listed firms (see Ntim 2012; 2013) leading to the possibility of powerful 
owner or owner-related CEOs. Consequently, CEO age and seniority may only increase CEO 
power so that their inclination towards expropriation may motivate them to reduce voluntary 
disclosure. 
                                                     
 
4 In panel regressions it is possible to find correlations either across firms or time (Peterson, 2009). This may 
necessitate the need to use standard errors that are robust across firms, time or the simultaneous correlations along 
two dimensions (double clustering). Thompson (2011) noted that w ile double clustering produce accurate 
standard error estimates, it does not make much difference in instances wher  the number of firms far exceeds the 
time periods. Thomson further argued that double clustering is not needed in an unbalanced panel since fixing the 
number of observations in one direction is enough to make the bias disappear. Therefore we use one-direction 




Also, foreign ownership (FORO) has a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with GOVIN at the 1% level of significance (FORO = 0.08, T-Statistics = 4.55). Specifically, 
the results indicate that a 1% increase in the level of foreign ownership increases total CG 
disclosure (GOVIN) by 0.08%. Similarly, FORO has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with both SHARE (FORO = 0.07, T-Statistics = 5.68) and STAKE (FORO = 0.12, 
T-Statistics =1.68) as well as all the other sub-indices except IA.  Existing literature sugg st 
that foreign owners are disadvantged in their quest for information to monitor management. 
Nevertheless, higher disclosure levels bridges the information asymmetry between domestic 
and foreign owners (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). This finding is also consistent with 
previous studies such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002); and Singhvi (1968) that reported a positive 
relationship between foreign ownerships and disclosure levels. Further, the finding that FORO 
has no statistical relationship with IA is surprising. This finding implies that foreign owners do 
not influence the disclosure of CG provisions that relate to internal auditing. This could also 
be attributed to the fact foreign owners are unfamiliar with the nature of the internal audit 
disclosures in King III.  More so, FORO has a non-significant relationship with SHST (FORO 
= 0.01, T-Statistics =1.03). This finding is inconsistent with H2 and indicates that foreign 
owners place much premium on disclosure levels irrespective of whether they protect the 
interests of shareholders or other non-shareholding stakeholders. 
Furthermore, INSO has a positive relationship with GOVIN (INSO = 0.05, T-Statistics 
= 4.46). This imply that a 1% increase in the level of institutional ownership increases the level 
of total CG disclosure by 0.05%. Similarly, the results shows a positive relationship between 
INSO and STAKE (INSO = 0.07, T-Statistics = 3.72), SHARE (INSO = 0.05, T-Statistics = 
4.38) and all the other sub-indices except IA. These imply that a 1% increase in INSO increases 
SHARE (STAKE) by 0.05% (0.07%). This finding support Hawley and Williams (2000) 
assertion that institutional investors have strong fiduciary relationships that may propel their 
inclinations towards voluntary CG disclosure. Chung and Zhang, (2011) also note that 
institutional investors mostly have larger stakes in firms which motivates them to monitor 
management instead of free riding. Most importantly, INSO has a positive relationship with 
SHST (INSO = 0.01, T-Statistics = 1.95). The coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
at 10%. This finding supports H3 that companies with higher levels of institutional investors 
disclose more shareholder CG information relative to stakeholder CG information. This finding 
is also consistent with OECD (2009) that institutional investors invest mainly for financial 
returns. Therefore whilst they will not hinder the disclosure of CG information that protects 
the interests of other non-shareholding stakeholders, (as exhibited by the positive relationship 
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with STAKE), they are mainly concerned with the disclosure of shareholder CG information 
(Brammer and Millington, 2004). 
Also, BIND has no significant relationship with GOVIN (BIND = -0.01, T-Statistics = 
-1.58), SHARE (BIND = 0.01, T-Statistics = 0.30), STAKE (BIND = -0.03, T-Statistics = -
0.64) and all the other sub-indices. Most importantly, BIND has no relationship with SHST 
(BIND = 0.01, T-Statistics =1.51). This finding contradicts H4 as well as the agency theory 
preposition that outside directors are good monitors of management (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). However, other studies especially those from emerging markets have also failed 
to find a statistically significant relationship. Samaha et al. (2012) note the dominance of large 
blockholdings in developing countries. Su Xu and Phan, (2008) note that higher levels of 
ownership concentration in emerging markets lead to the appointment of non-executive 
directors who may not be independent and thus collude with management to facilitate the 
controlling shareholders` expropriation. Consistent with this, Hwang and Kim (2009) attribute 
the lack of a significant relationship between board independence and CG disclosure to the 
stronger ties between non-executive directors and insiders that compromise their 
independence. However, the SA case may also be attributed to a lack of requisite business 
knowledge by independent directors(see Paton and Baker, 1987) since affirmative action rules 
encourage firms to appoint directors by also considering affirmative action rules instead of 
solely based on competence (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
BSIZE has a non-significant relationship with GOVIN (BSIZE= -5.13, T-Statistics = -
1.58) and STAKE (BSIZE= -3.37, T-Statistics = -0.79). This results support the agency theory 
view that larger boards are ineffective, difficult to coordinate and are associated with shirking 
and free-riding (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). Nevertheless, BSIZE exhibits a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with SHARE (BSIZE = -5.54, T-Statistics= -1.80) and IA 
(BSIZE= -12.36, T-Statistics = -2.92). This indicates that firms with larger boards disclose less 
of CG information relating to internal audit as well as other CG information that protects the 
interests of shareholders. This finding is consistent with Jensen (1993) that entrenched CEOs 
are more likely to control larger boards than smaller boards leading to a reduction of in the 
disclosure of monitoring intensive CG provisions intended to protect the interests of 
shareholders. Indeed, weaker internal audit mechanisms may make it easier for entrenched 
CEOs to expropriate shareholder wealth. Also, and in contrast with H5 board size has a 
negative relationship with SHST (BSIZE = -1.33, T-Statistics = -2.53). This implies that firm 
with bigger board size disclose more CG information that seeks to protect the interests of other 
non-shareholding stakeholders  relative to CG information that seeks to protect the interests of 
25 
 
shareholders. This finding supports the view that larger boards are likely to be heterogeneous 
(Butler, 2012) and may thus disclose more CG information to suit the interests of these 
heterogeneous groups. In the SA case, bigger boards are apt to have representatives of several 
interests groups and this may result in the disclosure of more CG information to satisfy these 
groups rather than focusing on only shareholders. Alternatively, Prior et al. (2008) find that 
entrenched managers disclose more information non-shareholder related information to garner 
powerful stakeholders` support in order to facilitate their rent-seeking objective. Therefore, it 
could also be the case that managers of firms with bigger board size disclose more stakeholder 
related CG information to garner stakeholder support for rent extraction purposes. This is even 
more critical in SA where affirmative action stakeholder groups are so powerful. 
Further, we find that GDIV has a positive relationship with GOVIN (GDIV = 5.80, T-
Statistics = 3.87). The results imply that compared to boards without a woman director, boards 
with at least one woman director has an increase of 5.8% in CG disclosure. Similarly, gender 
diversity has a positive relationship with all the other sub-indices except BOD and AC. This 
implies that women directors have no effect on the disclosure of CG provisions relating to the 
board of directors as well as the audit committee. There is also a positive relationship between 
gender and both SHARE (GDIV= 4.97, T-Statistics = 3.71) and STAKE (GDIV=10.15, T-
Statistics = 3.21). This is consistent with the conflict resolution hypothesis (Cai et al.2011) that 
women directors positively influence the disclosure of CG information that relates to both 
shareholders and other non-shareholding stakeholders. This indicate that board gender 
diversity may be a mechanism for avoiding conflicts between shareholders and other non-
shareholding stakeholders.  More so, the findings that gender diversity has no relationship with 
BOD and AC signify that boards with women directors disclose less monitoring intensive CG 
provisions relating to the board of directors and the audit committee and confirms the findings 
of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al.(2011) that gender may be a substitute CG 
monitoring device. More so, the results indicate that GDIV has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with SHST (GDIV = -0.92, T-Statistics = -3.16). This finding supports 
H6 and implies that women directors influence the disclosure of less CG information that 
protects the interests of shareholders relative to CG information that protects the interests of 
other non-shareholding stakeholders. This results is in tandem with Transparency international 
(2000) that women have a higher standard of ethical behaviour and are thus concerned with the 
well-being of the general society. Arguably, women directors may be concerned with the 
general well-being of stakeholders (including shareholders) as against adhering strictly to the 
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shareholder-centric view. The finding is also consistent with Post et al. (2011) that women 
directors influence the disclosure of environmentally related information. 
RDIV has a positive relationship with GOVIN (RDIV = 10.33, T-Statistics = 9.13) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicate that compared to boards without an ethnic 
minority director, boards with ethnic minority directors have a 10.33% increase in CG 
disclosure. Similarly RDIV has a positive and statistically significant relationship with SHARE 
(RDIV = 8.51, T-Statistics = 7.85), STAKE (RDIV = 18.78, T-Stats = 12.04) and across all the 
other sub-indices. This finding is consistent with the argument that racial diversity may 
facilitate communication to a heterogeneous group by increasing CG disclosure (Butler, 2012 
and Lang, 1986). Further, the finding that RDIV has a positive relationship with monitoring-
intensive aspects of GOVIN such as AC and BOD indicate that ethnicity may be a complement 
to effective CG mechanisms.  In the SA case where boards are dominated by the minority white 
population, racial diversity may improve board independence and increase monitoring leading 
to higher levels of CG disclosure (Broome et al. 2011). Also, the results indicate that RDIV 
has a negative and statistically significant relationship with SHST (RDIV = -1.13, T-Statistics 
= -3.95). This is consistent with H7 and indicate that the presence of ethnic minority directors 
reduces the probability of disclosing more CG provisions that seek to protect the interests of 
shareholders (SHARE) relative to CG provisions that seek to protect the interests of other non-
shareholding stakeholders (STAKE). This finding is consistent with the arguments that racially 
diverse boards disclose more diverse CG information (Butler, 2012) 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with the literature. 
Leverage has a negative relationship with GOVIN but the results is not statistically significant. 
Similarly, with the exception of IRD, leverage has no statistically significant relationship with 
all the sub-indices as well as SHST. Further, growth has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with GOVIN, GR, SHARE and STAKE. This is also consistent with Khurana et 
al. (2006) that high growth firms have a need for external financing and will therefore disclose 
more CG information to reduce information asymmetry which will in turn reduce the cost of 
external financing. Further, profitability (ROE) has a positive relationship with GOVIN but the 
relationship is not statistically significant. More importantly, profitability has no statistically 
significant relationship with SHST. These findings are also consistent with Samaha et al. 
(2012) who report no statistically significant relationship for profitability and voluntary CG 
disclosure. Also, firm size has a positive and significant relationship with GOVIN. This 
indicate that bigger firms disclose more CG information.  




6. Robustness Tests 
As noted in section 4 the results of the Hausman test proved inconclusive. Therefore, 
to the extent that the adoption of the random effects estimation technique was based on the 
results of the Hausman tests, it could be the case that the results are sensitive to the estimation 
technique. Based on this, a fixed effects model is employed to re-estimate all the regressions. 
Specifically, whereas model 1-8 in table 8 are estimated using fixed effects regression, model 
9 is estimated using a conditional fixed effects regression due to the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable (SHST) in that regression.  
 The results as presented in Table 8 indicate that results from the fixed effects models 
are qualitatively similar to that of the random effects estimations. For example, consistent with 
the random effects regressions, results from the fixed effects regressions indicate foreign 
ownership (FORO), institutional ownership (INSO) gender diversity (GDIV) and ethnic 
diversity (RDIV) exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship with GOVIN. 
Similarly, CEO age (AGE) has a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
GOVIN. Results for the other sub-indices are also qualitatively similar. 
 Further, consistent with the random effects logistic regressions, institutional ownership 
(INSO) has a positive relationship with SHST. This confirms the earlier findings that 
institutional investors increase the disclosure of CG provisions that protects the interests of 
shareholders relative to that of other non-shareholding stakeholders.  Also, board size (BSIZE) 
and gender diversity (GDIV) have negative and statistically significant relationships with 
SHST. This is also consistent with the findings of the random effects logistics regressions that 
board size and gender reduces the disclosure of CG information that protects the interests of 
shareholders relative to that of other non-shareholding stakeholders. Notwithstanding these, 
ethnicity (RDIV) has no statistically significant relationship with SHST. This implies that 
ethnic minority directors (RDIV) are not a determinant of the variation in the disclosure of 
shareholder versus stakeholder CG provisions. This is also in contrast with the findings of the 
random effects logistic regressions that showed a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with SHST. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar whether the fixed effects 
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or the random effects estimation technique is used. Further attempts were also made to address 
potential endogeneity problems.5 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The determinants of CG disclosure have been widely examined in the literature. In the 
case of SA, three CG reforms have been pursued in the past decades in the form of the King I 
(1994), King II (2002) and King III (2009). However, although emerging markets have 
characteristics (concentrated ownership, weak regulatory enforcement, and weak shareholder 
activism) different from their developed counterparts, CG reforms mainly mimic that of other 
developed countries (Samaha et al., 2012). The SA context is distinct because in addition to 
adopting various CG provisions in the developed countries, it also stresses the need to comply 
with affirmative action rules and other stakeholder CG provisions (Ntim et al., 2012). These 
coupled with its voluntary compliance regime raises questions as to whether firms, especially 
foreign multi-nationals who may not be used to such disclosure requirements, will comply.  
In terms of the level of compliance, we find that even though King III is relatively new, 
the level of compliance is very high with mean scores ranging from 65.73% to 60.53% for 
GOVIN, SHARE and STAKE. These compliance levels compare favourably with previous SA 
studies (Ntim et. al., 2012a; Ntim et al. 2012b). Specifically, the sub-indices show that STAKE 
has a higher mean than SHARE. This suggests that SA firms have become accustomed to the 
unique stakeholder disclosure requirements. Notwithstanding these, the CG disclosure indices 
also show large variations among firms with a mean of 61.44% and standard deviation of 19.55 
for GOVIN. This indicates high degree of heterogeneity among SA listed firms in terms of 
disclosure. Again, Ntim et al. (2012b) also reported similar variation in compliance on the King 
II provisions. This also implies that some SA listed firms are taking a long time to appreciate 
the importance of voluntary disclosure. 
Regarding the determinants of CG disclosure of SA listed companies, we find that, 
ceteris paribus, the extent of shareholder-related CG disclosure relative to stakeholder-related 
                                                     
 
5 To deal with the problem of endogeneity we consider adopting a dynamic p nel model. Specifically we consider 
the Arrelano Bond estimator (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, for consistent estimation this method 
requires two specification tests - (1) a test to confirm that the error term is serially uncorrelated and (2) a test of 
overidentifying restrictions (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Our data passed the former and failed the later 
making this method unsuitable. A plausible alternative is the use of a 2SLS, but this presents another problem of 
finding suitable instrumental variables which we could not find. 
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disclosure is (1) lower with at least one woman directors, bigger boards, and at least one “non-
white” director; and (2) higher with higher levels of foreign ownership. More so, whereas 
foreign ownership, institutional ownership, gender diversity and racial diversity increase both 
shareholder-related and stakeholder-related CG disclosures, bigger boards reduces 
shareholder-related CG disclosures but not stakeholder-related CG disclosures. In contrast, 
older CEOs reduce both stakeholder-related disclosures and shareholder-related disclosures. 
Notwithstanding these, the overall levels of CG disclosure in SA (as proxied by GOVIN) 
increases with higher levels of institutional and foreign ownership, racial diversity, as well as 
gender diversity and decreases with CEO age.  
This paper contributes to the literature by particularly responding to recent calls by 
Samaha et al. (2012) for studies that investigate the determinants of CG provisions that protects 
the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders and bondholders. The results show that 
different classes of shareholders, and CEO and firm characteristics may impact differently on 
the type of CG disclosure whether of shareholder or stakeholder origin. In terms of policy 
implications the findings are important for policymakers and non-governmental organisations, 
environmental activists etc. that are keen to hold companies accountable for the effect of their 
operations on other non-shareholding stakeholders. The findings are also relevant for investors 
that invest in firms for other non-financial motives. To these investors the results provide a 
useful guide as to which firms to invest in given the peculiar characteristics of their board, CEO 
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                                                                                                                           Table 1: Variable Definition 
 
Variable name                                                Measurement and Description 
Dependent Variables 
GOVIN   CG index that combines the provisions contained in both SHARE and STAKE 
SHARE   CG disclosure index containing 61 provisions in King III that seeks to protect the interest of shareholders. 
STAKE     CG disclosure index containing 11 provisions in King III that seeks to protect      the interest of stakeholders. 
STST                   A dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if a firm scores higher on STAKE than SHARE otherwise “0” 
SHST     A dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if a firm scores higher on SHARE than STAKE otherwise “0”. 
Independent variables 
AGE   The natural logarithm of CEO age. 
FORO   Percentage of ordinary shares held by foreign shareholders 
INSO   Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders 
BIND                  The number of non-executive directors expressed as a percentage of the total board size 
BSIZE               The natural logarithm of total board size. 
GDIV    A dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the board consists of at least one male and one female otherwise”0”. 
RDIV    A dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the board consists of at least one white and one non-white, otherwise 
                           “0”.                                        
Control Variables 
LEV Ratio of total debts to total assets 
GROWTH        The percentage of current year`s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales 
ROE                  Total operating profit divided by total equity 






























Note: Variables are defined as follows; GOVIN is a CG disclosure index that consisting of 72 CG provisions in 
King III. SHARE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions that protects the inter sts of 
shareholders. STAKE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 11 CG provisions that protects the inter sts of 
stakeholders. SHST is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on SHARE thank STAKE otherwise 
“0”. STSH is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on STAKE thank SHARE otherwise “0”. BOD 
is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 33 CG provisions that relates to the board of directors. AC is a sub-index 
of SHARE consisting of 13 CG provisions that relates to the audit committee. GR is a sub-index of SHARE 
consisting of 10 CG provisions that relates to the governance of risk. IA is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 2 
CG provisions that relates to internal audit. IRD is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 3 CG provisions that 
relates to integrated reporting and disclosure. 
Table 2: Level of Compliance on the Main Corporate Governance Index and Other Sub-Indices 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
GOVIN 1110 61.44 19.55 14.045 98.22 
SHARE 1110 60.53 18.82 12.23 98.59 
STAKE 1110 65.72 28.63 8 100 
SHST 1110 0.29 0.45 0 1 
STSH 1110 0.71 0.45 0 1 
BOD 1110 64.99 23.9 5.32 100 
AC 1110 69.83 25.11 0 100 
GR 1110 62.66 18.57 0 100 
IA 1110 56.13 22.7 0 100 





Table 3 Level of Compliance across the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Industry Classification. 
Panel : A 
 
  GOVIN  SHARE  STAKE  Mean Diff 
Industry*  Mean Std.Dev 25th 50th 75th 95th  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev   
Basic Material  62.52 19.14 51.81 67.47 75.9 85.54  60.92 18.17  68.22 26.88  -7.3*** 
Industrials  60.21 19.08 48.19 64.46 74.7 80.72  59.6 18.07  62.64 29.87  -3.04*** 
Consumer Services  61.3 18.83 50.65 62.65 75.9 85.54  61.06 18.27  63.36 28.84  -2.99 
Consumer Goods  59.02 24.74 45.78 69.88 75.9 86.75  58.07 24.43  65 30.71  -6.94*** 
Health Care  69.18 18.3 65.06 75.91 82.53 86.75  68.39 17.52  73.95 26.03  -5.55*** 
Telecommunications  62.21 18.89 44.58 68.07 80.12 83.13  59.62 20.56  78 23.86  -18.38*** 
Technology  62.99 16.18 54.22 63.86 75.9 85.54  62.12 15.43  68.99 24.73  -6.88*** 
(Table 3 continues on the next page) 
Table 3 Continued: Panel B 
 
  SHST  STSH  BOD  AC  GRI  IA  IRD 
  Mean  
Std. 
Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev 
Basic Material  0.26 0.43  0.74 0.43  67.54 22.81  69.02 24.60  60.31 26.44  52.32 23.45  57.23 35.18 
Industrial  0.28 0.45  0.71 0.450  64.35 21.97  70.09 23.97  60.42 29.87  55.14 24.07  51.71 37.56 
Consumer Services  0.32 0.46  0.67 0.46  64.74 22.71  71.26 23.36  63.05 29.25  57.54 21.79  55.15 35.74 
Consumer Goods  0.15 0.36  0.84 0.36  61.32 31.34  64.43 32.89  65.58 30.65  57.89 22.63  52.33 36.82 
Heath Care  0.18 0.39  0.81 0.39  68.29 27.35  73.10 22.10  70.51 24.13  63.89 13.46  61.80 35.05 
Telecommunications  0.13 0.35  0.86 0.35  60.35 31.33  65.15 31.67  77.14 20.01  64.81 11.11  63.88 35.07 
Oil and Gas  0.29 0.45  0.70 0.45  65.96 20.26  75.99 19.71  65.48 26.95  59.40 20.56  55.98 33.76 
 
*Johannesburg Stock Exchange Industry Classification. *** represents tati tical significance at the 5% level. 
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Note: *** represents statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
Table 4: A The level of compliance across years. 
Panel: A 
 
YEAR  GOVIN  SHARE   STAKE    
  Mean Std.Dev 25th 50th 75th 95th  Mean Std.Dev  Mean Std.Dev  Mean Diff 
2008  50.38 18.98 34.94 51.81 65.06 75.9  49.43 18.57  54.73 29.64  -5.3*** 
2009  57.34 17.12 48.19 59.04 69.88 77.11  56.5 16.61  62.23 26.04  -5.75*** 
2010  60.41 16.67 51.81 62.65 73.49 79.52  59.47 15.62  64.59 27.84  -5.12*** 
2011  65.67 18.18 56.63 71.08 79.53 85.54  64.83 16.95  69.59 28.26  -4.76*** 
2012  66.77 20.23 61.45 72.29 80.72 87.95  65.84 19.39  70.66 28.67  -4.82*** 





Table 4: Continued 
Panel : B 
  SHST  STSH  BOD  AC  GR  IA  IRD 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev 
2008  0.34 0.47  0.65 0.47  53.99 24.86  52.87 27.27  48.98 30.56  51.71 26.66  28.46 16.12 
2009  0.28 0.45  0.71 0.45  60.05 22.89  65.30 23.57  58.08 27.30  57.11 21.39  31.34 10.52 
2010  0.29 0.45  0.70 0.45  64.21 21.04  71.05 22.10  60.25 29.02  54.05 24.01  32.06 16.43 
2011  0.31 0.46  0.68 0.46  69.53 21.56  74.89 22.46  66.15 28.17  55.31 23.51  66.84 39.08 
2012  0.27 0.44  0.72 0.44  68.4 25.24  74.59 26.90  67.73 29.22  54.05 25.00  74.59 38.97 












Table 5: Descriptive Statistics:  Independent Variables 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th   50th      75th 95th 
Independent Variables 
AGE 3.91 0.17 3.89 3.91 3.95 4.11 
FORO 2.58 12.08 0 0 0 16.3 
INSO 21.43 31.12 0 3.06 32.4 92.11 
BIND 44.22 22.74 28.57 44.44 62.5 80 
BSIZE 2.17 0.3 1.95 2.2 2.3 2.56 
GDIV 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 1 
RDIV 0.55 0.5 0 1 1 1 
Control Variables 
LEV 0.49 0.27 0.32 0.48 0.61 0.84 
GROWTH 17.43 95.39 -9.06 2.19 21.56 82.56 
ROE -0.01 3.66 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.51 
SIZE 12.23 2.09 10.94 12.2 13.92 15.59 
 
Note: Variables are defined as follows; GOVIN is a CG disclosure index that consisting of 72 CG provisions in King
III. SHARE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions that protects the inter sts of shareholders. 
STAKE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 11 CG provisions that protects the interests of stakeholders. SHST is 
a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on SHARE thank STAKE otherwise “0”. AGE is the natural 
logarithm of CEO age. FORO is the percentage shares held by foreigners. INSO is the percentage of shares held by 
institutions. BIND is the number of non-executive directors expressed as a percentage of total board size. BSIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total board size. GDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one woman 
director otherwise “0”. RDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one ethnic minority director 
otherwise “0”. LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets. GROWTH is the percentage of current year`s sales 
minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. ROE is total operating profit divided by total equity. SIZE is 





Note: + indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. Variables are defined as follows; GOVIN is a CG disclosure index that consisting of 72 CG provisions in King III. SHARE 
is a CG disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions that protects the interests of shareholders. STAKE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 11 CG provisions that protects the 
interests of stakeholders. SHST is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on SHARE thank STAKE otherwise “0”. AGE is the natural logarithm of CEO age. FORO is 
the percentage shares held by foreigners. INSO is the percentage of shares held by institutions. BIND is the number of non-executive directors expressed as a percentage of total board 
size. BSIZE is the natural logarithm of total board size. GDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one woman director otherwise “0”. RDIV is a dummy variable 
equal to “1” if a firm has at least one ethnic minority director otherwise “0”. LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets. GROWTH is the percentage of current year`s sales 
minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. ROE is total operating profit divided by total equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Table 6: Correlation Matrix 
 
 GOVIN SHARE STAKE SHST AGE FORO INSO BIND BSIZE GDIV RDIV LEV GROWTH ROE 
GOVIN 1              
SHARE .98+ 1             
STAKE .82+ .72+ 1            
SHST -.22+ -.12+ -.55+ 1           
AGE -.03 -.02 -.02 -.04 1          
FORO .08+ .08+ .08+ .00 -.02 1         
INSO .04 .04 .06 .07+ .07+ -.02 1        
BIND -.04 -.02 -.03 .02 -.02 .09+ .07+ 1       
BSIZE .22+ .20+ .25+ -.25+ .08+ .09+ .03 .06+ 1      
GDIV .22+ .19+ .30+ -.18+ .04 .03 .14+ .09+ .28+ 1     
RDIV .34+ .30+ .43+ -.20+ .05 .10+ .20+ .07+ .27+ .45+ 1    
LEV -.09+ -.09+ -.08+ -.01 -.00 .06 .01 .02 -.03 -.01 -.07+ 1   
GROWTH .01 .01 .00 .03 -.04 -.01 .01 -.05 .00 .06 .03 .03 1  
ROE -.00 .00 -.01 .02 -.01 .01 .04 .05 .05 -.01 .00 -.07+ .01 1 




Table 7: Results of Random Effects Regressions for the Determinants of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure. 
 
   SUB-INDEX   
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) 
 GOVIN  BOD AC GR IA IRD  SHARE STAKE  SHST 
AGE -6.65**  -6.50* -8.30* -12.61*** -5.48** -1.52  -4.86** -9.68***  0.06 
 (-2.46)  (-1.81) (-1.94) (-2.70) (-1.97) (-0.65)  (-2.03) (-3.69)  (0.12) 
FORO 0.08***  0.13*** 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.04 0.17***  0.07*** 0.12*  0.01 
 (4.55)  (2.84) (7.01) (4.07) (0.53) (3.07)  (5.68) (1.68)  (1.03) 
INSO 0.05***  0.02* 0.06* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.06*  0.05*** 0.07***  0.01* 
 (4.46)  (1.88) (1.86) (2.79) (2.70) (1.83)  (4.38) (3.71)  (1.95) 
BIND -0.01  -0.01 -0.07* 0.04 -0.01 -0.06  0.01 -0.03  0.01 
 (-0.28)  (-0.38) (-1.82) (1.04) (-0.40) (-1.44)  (0.30) (-0.64)  (1.51) 
BSIZE -5.13  0.85 -0.62 -2.57 -12.36*** -2.30  -5.54* -3.37  -1.33** 
 (-1.58)  -0.18 (-0.10) (-0.50) (-2.92) (-0.44)  (-1.80) (-0.79)  (-2.53) 
GDIV 5.80***  3.34 3.61 5.72* 7.47*** 7.48***  4.97*** 10.15***  -0.92*** 
 (3.87)  (1.49) (1.24) (1.96) (3.35) (3.10)  (3.71) (3.21)  (-3.16) 
RDIV 10.33***  7.19*** 8.86*** 15.62*** 11.01*** 9.66***  8.51*** 18.78***  -1.13*** 
 (9.13)  (3.19) (3.68) (5.36) (12.48) (2.58)  (7.85) (12.04)  (-3.95) 
LEV -2.80  -4.85 -2.17 -4.33 -0.65 -8.80**  -2.98 -3.08  -0.67 
 (-0.86)  (-0.96) (-0.63) (-1.08) (-0.13) (-2.45)  (-0.97) (-0.81)  (-1.16) 
GROWTH 0.01***  0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 -0.01  0.01*** 0.01**  0.00 
 (4.25)  (1.58) (1.48) (3.24) (1.26) (-0.49)  (3.86) (2.28)  (0.72) 
ROE 0.00  0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.12*** -0.29**  0.01 -0.04*  0.02 
 (0.01)  (0.84) (-0.88) (0.44) (-2.62) (-2.26)  (0.43) (-1.92)  (0.53) 
SIZE 1.90***  1.95*** 0.90 0.15 0.36 2.10***  1.75*** 2.50**  -0.11 
 (2.83)  (2.59) (1.31) (0.2) (0.53) (3.87)  (2.97) (2.09)  (-1.40) 
CONSTANT 60.28***  54.68*** 82.03*** 92.58*** 86.64*** 10.01  56.31*** 58.53***  3.726 
 (8.65)  (4.41) (3.96) (5.16) (4.83) (0.85)  (9.62) (11.15)  (1.53) 
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N 871  871 871 871 871 871  871 871  871 
YEAR YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
INDUSTRY YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
R2 0.23  0.11 0.11 0.21 0.20 0.59  0.22 0.20  0.12 
Wald Chi2 293.57***  141.12*** 143.04*** 205.57*** 182.49*** 1053.48***  262.82*** 299.50***  146.61*** 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All regressions are run with cluster-robust standard errors. Variables are 
defined as follows; GOVIN is a CG disclosure index that consisting of 72 CG provisions in King III. SHARE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions 
that protects the interests of shareholders. STAKE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 11 CG provisions that protects the interests of stakeholders. SHST is a dummy 
variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on SHARE thank STAKE otherwise “0”. STSH is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on STAKE thank 
SHARE otherwise “0”. BOD is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 33 CG provisions that relates to the board of directors. AC is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 
13 CG provisions that relates to the audit committee. GR is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 10 CG provisions that relates to the governance of risk. IA is a sub-
index of SHARE consisting of 2 CG provisions that relates to internal audit. IRD is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 3 CG provisions that relates to integrated 
reporting and disclosure. AGE is the natural logarithm of CEO age. FORO is the percentage shares held by foreigners. INSO is the percentage of shares held by 
institutions. BIND is the number of non-executive directors expressed as a percentage of total board size. BSIZE is the natural logarithm of total board size. GDIV is a 
dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one woman director otherwise “0”. RDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one ethnic minority 
director otherwise “0”. LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets. GROWTH is the percentage of current year`s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous 
year’s sales. ROE is total operating profit divided by total equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
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Table 8: Results of Fixed Effects Regressions for the Determinants of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure. 
 
    SUB-INDICES   
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) 
  GOVIN  BOD AC GR IA IRD  SHARE STAKE  SHST   
AGE  -5.55**  -7.26* -9.14* -10.96* -3.90 2.36  -3.90* -8.16***  0.12 
  (-3.36)  (-2.21) (-1.98) (-1.99) (-0.99) (0.71)  (-2.36) (-4.94)  (0.18) 
FORO  0.09**  0.22*** 0.25*** 0.37*** 0.13* 0.13*  0.07 0.18*  0.00 
  (2.48)  (4.19) (4.62) (12.56) (2.17) (1.97)  (1.80) (2.25)  (0.56) 
INSO  0.08***  0.05 0.08* 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12**  0.07** 0.13***  0.01*   
  (4.16)  (1.69) (2.05) (4.99) (4.43) (3.47)  (3.47) (5.73)  (1.75) 
BIND  0.04  0.03 -0.01 0.13*** 0.02 -0.06**  0.04 0.06  0.00 
  (1.50)  (0.65) (-0.25) (4.91) (0.83) (-3.27)  (1.58) (1.22)  (0.11) 
BSIZE  -5.28  2.01 1.42 -3.02 -12.92** -2.10  -6.00* -2.72  -1.91*** 
  (-1.79)  (0.35) (0.23) (-0.59) (-3.54) (-0.32)  (-2.04) (-0.65)  (-2.70)   
GDIV  6.43**  4.55 3.79 10.65** 9.35*** 9.70**  5.56** 11.29***  -1.05**  
  (3.49)  (1.72) (1.32) (3.29) (6.90) (2.50)  (3.03) (4.47)  (-2.41)   
RDIV  8.68***  4.28 6.06* 12.96*** 11.24*** 10.95**  7.28*** 14.05***  -0.57 
  (7.69)  (1.86) (2.44) (4.39) (8.11) (2.74)  (6.00) (6.26)  (-1.33)   
LEV  4.19  1.44 4.56 11.09 6.33 4.31  2.55 9.21  -1.04 
  (1.18)  (0.28) (0.96) (1.49) (1.30) (0.72)  (0.76) (1.90)  (-0.95)   
GROWTH  0.01***  0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.01  0.01*** 0.01*  0.00 
  (4.68)  (2.65) (2.00) (2.00) (0.60) (-0.92)  (4.67) (2.02)  (0.46) 
ROE  0.01  0.03 -0.04* 0.05 -0.12* -0.13  0.01 0.00  0.03 
  (0.43)  (1.2) (-1.99) (1.00) (-2.27) (-1.41)  (0.64) (0.08)  (0.48) 
SIZE  -1.13  -2.64 -2.96 -3.88** -0.87 -0.60  -1.41 1.05  -0.64**  
  (-1.27)  (-1.50) (-1.60) (-2.60) (-0.59) (-0.35)  (-1.64) -0.81  (-2.00)   




Note: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All regressions are run with cluster-robust standard errors. Variables re defined 
as follows; GOVIN is a CG disclosure index that consisting of 72 CG provisions in KingIII. SHARE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 61 CG provisions that protects the 
interests of shareholders. STAKE is a CG disclosure index consisting of 11 CG provisions that protects the interests of stakeholders. SHST is a dummy variable equal to “1” if 
a firm scores higher on SHARE thank STAKE otherwise “0”. STSH is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm scores higher on STAKE thank SHARE otherwise “0”. BOD is a 
sub-index of SHARE consisting of 33 CG provisions that relates to the board of directors. AC is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 13 CG provisions that relates to the audit 
committee. GR is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 10 CG provisions that relates to the governance of risk. IA is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 2 CG provisions that 
relates to internal audit. IRD is a sub-index of SHARE consisting of 3 CG provisions that relates to integrated reporting and disclosure. AGE is the natural logarithm of CEO 
age. FORO is the percentage shares held by foreigners. INSO is the percentage of shares held by institutions. BIND is the number of non-executive directors expressed as a 
percentage of total board size. BSIZE is the natural logarithm of total board size. GDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one woman director otherwise 
“0”. RDIV is a dummy variable equal to “1” if a firm has at least one ethnic minority director otherwise “0”. LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets. GROWTH is 
the percentage of current year`s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. ROE is total operating profit divided by total equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. 
  -12.59  -4.86 -9.67 -8.77 -7.19 -1.52  -13.94 -3.22           
N  871  871 871 871 871 871  871 871  506 
YEAR  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
INDUSTRY  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES  NO 
R2  0.25  0.13 0.13 0.23 0.21 0.59  0.24 0.22  0.13 
Wald Chi2  15.41***  6.95*** 6.89*** 14.21*** 12.63*** 66.62***  14.42*** 12.77***  6.92***  
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Appendix 1:  A Summary of some vital corporate governance provisions 






2002 King Report   (King II) 
 












Allowed Not Allowed 
Non-executive 
directors 





Not Addressed The Board can Remove 
directors including the 





Not addressed A Program ensuring 
staggered rotation Should 






Not Addressed At Least Two executive 
Directors-The CEO and 
the Director of Finance 
Role Duality 
 









At Least Once Every Quarter At Least Once Every 
quarter 






Audit, Remuneration and Nomination Audit Remuneration, 




Majority of Independent Non-executive 
directors 



















Majority should be Financially literate Understanding of 
Integrated reporting, 
financial controls, Internal 
and external audit, 
corporate law and Risk 






Not Addressed Minimum twice a year 



















Not Addressed Risk Based  internal audit 
function 
































Ethics  Code of Ethics Code of Ethics 
Environment Environment Compliance with binding 
and non-binding laws 
Health and 
Safety 
Health and Safety Compliance with binding 




Employment equity Compliance with binding 
and non-binding laws 
Black 
Empowerment 
Black Empowerment Compliance with binding 
and non-binding laws 
HIV/AIDS HIV Not covered 



















Comply or Explain Apply or Explain 
Compliance or 
Regulation 




Appendix 2: Full list of the South African Corporate Governance Provisions based on the 
third corporate governance code (King III). 
=================================================== ======== 
Shareholder corporate governance provisions. 
1. Whether the role of chairman and CEO are separated  
2. Whether the Board chair person is an independent non-executive director. 
3. Whether the board meets at least four times a year. 
4. Whether individual directors` meetings record is disclosed. 
5. Whether the board chair person`s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and 
disclosed. 
6. Whether the finance director is a member of the board. 
7. Whether board members are clearly classified into executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive directors. 
8. Whether majority of board members are non-executive directors. 
9. Whether the majority of non-executive directors are independent non-executive 
directors. 
10. Whether there is a company secretary. 
11. Whether the board sub-committee performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
12. Whether the board`s effectiveness and performance is evaluated. 
13. Whether the effectiveness and performance of individual directors are evaluated. 
14. Whether director remuneration is disclosed. 
15. Whether the remuneration of the three highest paid non-director employees are 
disclosed. 
16. Whether the remuneration policy is disclosed. 
17. Whether shareholder approval was sought for the remuneration policy. 
 
18. Whether the board sub committees` performance and effectiveness are evaluated. 
19. Whether director`s biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
20. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
21. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority of independent directors. 
22. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
23. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
24. Whether the nomination committee members meeting attendance record is 
disclosed. 
25. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
26. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NED. 
27. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an IND. 
28. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 




30. Whether the chairman and other non-executive directors do not receive share 
options or other incentive awards geared to share price or corporate performance. 
31. Whether directors’ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
32. Whether director remuneration policy and procedure is disclosed. 
33. Whether directors have access to free independent legal advice. 
34. The existence of an audit committee 
35. Whether the audit committee meet at least twice a year. 
36. Whether audit committee consists entirely of independent non-executive directors. 
37.  Whether the audit committee reported on the effectiveness of the company`s 
system of internal controls. 
38. Whether the audit committee consist of at least three members. 
39. Whether the board chairman is not a member of the audit committee. 
40. Whether the audit committee reviewed the appropriateness of the expertise and 
adequacy of resources of the finance function. 
41. Whether the audit committee reported to shareholders in the annual report. 
42. Whether the names of all audit committee members are disclosed 
43. Whether the qualifications of all audit committee members are disclosed. 
44. Whether the period for which audit committee members have served on the audit 
committee is disclosed. 
45. Whether the number of audit committee meetings are disclosed. 
46. Whether member attendance at audit committee meetings are disclosed. 
47. Whether a risk committee has been established. 
48. Whether the risk committee members meeting attendance record is disclosed. 
Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-
systematic risks is disclosed. 
49. company risks will be managed is disclosed. 
50. Whether how the board has satisfied itself that risk assessments responses and 
interventions are effective is disclosed. 
51. Whether membership of the risk committee is disclosed. 
52. Whether membership of the risk committee include both executive and non-
executive directors. 
53. Whether the risk committee has a minimum of three members. 
54. Whether the risk committee met at least twice per year. 
55. Whether key sustainable risks as well as the responses to these risks are disclosed. 
56. Whether the board`s view on the effectiveness of the company`s risk management 
processes is disclosed. 
57. Whether the board`s comments on the effectiveness of the system of internal 
controls is disclosed. 
58. Whether the audit committee`s comment on the state of the internal financial 
control environment in the company is disclosed. 
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59. Whether an integrated report was produced. 
60. Whether the annual financial statement is included in the integrated report. 
61. Whether the board`s comment about the going concern status of the company is 
included in the integrated report. 
Stakeholder Corporate governance provisions 
62. Whether a narrative on how a company is complying with BBBEE requirements 
are disclosed. 
63. Whether narrative on the existence of code of ethics are disclosed. 
64. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying and implementing 
employment equity laws i  disclosed. 
65. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threats posed by the HIV/aids 
pandemic in South Africa is disclosed. 
66. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational 
health and safety of its employees is disclosed. 
67. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
rules and regulations on the environment is disclosed. 
68. Whether the sustainability report was independently assured. 
69. Whether the scope of the assurance to be provided on the sustainability report is 
disclosed. 
70. Whether the stakeholder policies are disclosed 
71. Whether stakeholder groupings are disclosed 
72. Whether  the nature and outcomes of the board`s dealings with stakeholders are 
disclosed 
 
